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Abstract
The problem of giving a computational meaning to classical reasoning
lies at the heart of logic. This article surveys three famous solutions to
this problem - the epsilon calculus, modified realizability and the dialectica
interpretation - and re-examines them from a modern perspective, with a
particular emphasis on connections with algorithms and programming.
1 Introduction
This paper grew out of two talks I gave on the subject of proof interpretations:
The first, at a conference on Hilbert’s epsilon calculus at the University of
Montpellier in 2015, and the second, at the Humboldt Kolleg workshop on the
mathesis universalis held in Como in 2017. Both of these events were notable
in they brought together researchers from mathematics, computer science and
philosophy, and as a consequence, speakers were faced with the challenge of
making their ideas appealing for and comprehensible to each of these groups.
The latter workshop was particularly fascinating in its focus on themathesis
universalis: The search for a universal mode of thought, or language, capable of
capturing and connecting ideas from all of the sciences. It struck me then that
part of my research has been driven, in a certain sense, by the desire to uncover
universal characteristics behind the central objects of my own field of study -
proof interpretations - and in particular to conceive of a language in which the
algorithmic ideas which underlie them can be elegantly expressed. As such,
my initial motivation when writing this article was to collect some of my own
thoughts in this direction and put them down on paper.
In doing so, however, I realised that an article of this kind could also serve
another purpose: To give an accessible and high level overview of a number
of proof interpretations which play a central role in the history of logic but
are often poorly understood outside of specialist areas of application. Proof
interpretations are, by their very nature, highly syntactic objects, and gaining
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an understanding of how they actually work when applied to a concrete proof
tends to require a certain amount of hands-on experience. But perhaps a simple
and informal case study tackled in parallel by several proof interpretationsmay
form an accessible and insightful introduction to these techniques whichwould
complement the many excellent textbooks on the subject?
I settled on an article which combines both of these goals. In the first
main section I give an overview of three very well-known computational in-
terpretations of classical logic: Hilbert’s epsilon calculus, Kreisel’s modified
realizability together with the A translation, and finally Go¨del’s Dialectica in-
terpretation. My tactic is suppress many of the complicated definitions and to
focus instead on a very simple example - the drinkers paradox - and sketch how
each interpretationwould dealwith it in turn. In doing so I am able to highlight
some of the key features which characterise each of the interpretations but are
often invisible until one has acquired a working knowledge of how they are
applied in practise.
In the second part, I turn my attention to the relationship between the
interpretations and core algorithmic ideas which underlie them. I begin with a
general discussion on proof interpretations and the roles they play in modern
proof theory, then focus on two ideas which feature in current research on
program extraction: learning procedures and stateful programs. Both of these
have been used by myself and others to characterise algorithms connected to
classical reasoning, and together offer an illustration of how traditional proof
theoretic techniques can be reinterpreted in a modern setting. Here I focus
primarily on the Dialectica interpretation, and continue to use the drinkers
paradox as a running example, in order to facilitate direction comparison with
the earlier section.
Prerequisites
I have sought to capture the spirit of the mathesis universalis in another way, by
making this article accessible to as general an audience as possible. Neverthe-
less, I assume the reader is acquainted first-order logic and formal reasoning,
and I expect a passing familiarity with the typed lambda calculus will make
what follows a lot easier to read. Just in case, I mention a few crucial things
here. The finite types are defined inductively by the following clauses:
• N is a type;
• if ρ and τ are types, ρ → τ is the type of functions from ρ to τ.
Often is it convenient to talk about product types ρ × τ in addition. Functions
which take functions as an argument are called functionals.
System T is the well-known calculus of primitive recursive functionals in all
finite types, whose terms consist of variables xρ, yρ, zρ, . . . for each type, symbols
for zero 0 : N and successor s : N → N, allow the construction of new terms
via lambda abstraction λx.t and application t(s), and finally, contain recursors
Rρ of each type, which allow the definition of primitive recursive functionals.
Further details on System T can be found in e.g. [7].
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A note on terminology
Proof interpretations are often inconsistently named and confused with one
another. In this paper, I will use the term functional interpretation to denote any
proof interpretation which maps proofs to functionals of higher-type: Thus
both realizability and the Dialectica interpretation are functional interpreta-
tions. The latter is also referred to as Go¨del’s functional interpretation, and
consequently often as just ‘the functional interpretation’. I am as guilty as
anyone for propagating such confusion elsewhere, but here, since I discuss a
number of proof interpretations, I will rigidly stick to the name Dialectica.
2 The drinkers paradox
The running example throughout this paper will be a simple theorem of clas-
sical predicate logic, commonly known as the drinkers paradox. This nickname
apparently originates with Smullyan [49], and refers to the following popular
formulation of the theorem in natural language:
In anypub, there is someone that, if they aredrinking, then everyone
in the pub is drinking.
Of course, in pure logical terms, the drinkers paradox is nothing more than the
simple first-order formula
∃n(P(n)→ ∀mP(m))
where here, since we will primarily work in the setting of classical arithmetic, P
is assumed to be some decidable predicate over the natural numbersN. In fact,
to make things slightly simpler for the functional interpretations (and more
interesting for the epsilon calculus) we will study the following prenexation of
the drinkers paradox:
DP : ∃n∀m(P(n) → P(m)).
which will henceforth be labelled DP.
The drinkers paradox is appealing for the proof theorist because it has a one-
line proof in classical logic which doesn’t give us any way to actually compute
the ‘canonical drinker’ n. It goes as follows: Either everyone in the pub is
drinking, in which case we can set n := 0, or there is at least one person mwho
is not drinker, in which case we set n := m.
As such, any computational interpretation of classical logic has to have
some way of dealing with the drinkers paradox, and as we will see, despite its
apparent simplicity, DP illuminates several key features of the interpretations,
which is precisely why it makes such a convenient working example.
Before moving on, a rather compact, semi-formal derivation of DP in a
Hilbert-style calculus is provided in Figure 1 - semi-formal because several of
our inferences conflate a number of steps. Thoughwewill refrain fromcarrying
out any formal manipulations on proof trees, this will be used later to provide
3
¬P(k)→ P(k)→ P(m)
∀r
¬P(k)→ ∀m(P(k)→ P(m))
∃ax
¬P(k) → ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m))
∃r
∃k¬P(k) → ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m))
P(m)→ P(0)→ P(m)
∀ax
∀kP(k) → P(0)→ P(m)
∀r
∀kP(k) → ∀m(P(0)→ P(m))
∃ax
∀kP(k) → ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m))
(∗)
∃k¬P(k) ∨ ∀kP(k) → ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m)) ∨ ∃n∀m(P(n) → P(m))
LEM
∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m)) ∨ ∃n∀m(P(n) → P(m))
ctr
∃n∀m(P(n) → P(m))
Figure 1: An informal Hilbert-style derivation of DP
some insight into how the different techniques act on the proof in order to
extract witnesses. Here ∀ax and ∀r refer to instances of the ∀-axiom and rule
respectively (and similarly for the existential quantifier), while LEMdenotes an
instance of the law of excluded-middle and ctr an instance of contraction. The
inference (∗) combines several steps which will typically not be relevant from a
computational point of view.
3 Three famous interpretations
In the first main part of the article, I give what is intended to be an accessible
outline of three of the most famous computational interpretations of classical
logic: Hilbert’s epsilon calculus, Kreisel’s modified realizability and Go¨del’s
Dialectica interpretation. The reader who wants to see a full exposition (and
indeed full definitions) of these interpretations is encouraged to consult one
of the many references I will provide on the way. My aim here is not to give
a comprehensive or detailed introduction, but to offer a case study which I
hope will not only provide some insight into how the interpretations work in
practise, but will hint at the deep connections between each of them.
It is important to point out that by focusing on just three interpretations, I in-
evitably exclude several significant approaches to program extraction, notably
those originating from the French tradition such as Krivine’s classical realiz-
ability [29]. This a reflection of the fact that I am somewhat familiar with the
former, and much less so with the latter. Moreover, each of the interpretations
I mention have a certain historical significance and are well-known outside of
theoretical computer science, which I feel also justifies my choice.
A note on precision
Proof interpretations are formal maps on derivations, and as such, act in a
very precise way on our proof of the drinkers paradox. Here, I give somewhat
imprecise versions of the formal extraction procedure, because I want to avoid
superfluous bureaucratic details as much as possible. My emphasis here is
on the salient features of the interpretations. A good example of this attitude
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is my cavalier approach to negative translations, which technically speaking
have to be carefully specified and are, for example, sensitive to whether they
are embeddings into intuitionistic or minimal logic. For the sake of clarity I
skirt such issues here and only mention them in passing. Naturally, the reader
curious about these subtleties will find a full explanation in the standard texts,
and detailed references will be given here.
3.1 The epsilon calculus
Hilbert’s epsilon calculus, developed in a series of lectures in the early 1920s,
constitutes one of the first attempts at grounding classical first-order theories
in a computational setting. Much like the Dialectica interpretation, it was first
presented as a technique for proving the consistency of arithmetic, in which it
comes hand-in-hand with the corresponding substitution method. For a more
detailed introduction to the epsilon calculus itself, together with an extensive
list of references, the reader is directed to [8].
While the epsilon calculus remains a topic of interest in mathematical logic,
philosophy and linguistics, concrete applications in mathematics or computer
science remain limited in comparison to the interpretations that follow - a
phenomenon which we discuss in Section 4. Nevertheless, of the three inter-
pretations we present in this section, the epsilon calculus is perhaps unrivalled
in the simplicity and elegance of its main idea: To first bring predicate logic
down to the propositional level by replacing all quantifier instances by a piece
of syntax called an epsilon term, and to then systematically eliminate these terms
via an complex backtracking algorithm, thus leaving us in a finitary system in
which existential statements are assigned explicit realizers.
Let’s look at this idea more closely. Very informally, the epsilon calculus
assigns to each predicate A(x) an epsilon term ǫxA(x), whose intended inter-
pretation is a choice function which selects a witness for ∃xA(x) whenever the
latter is true. The idea is then to replace the quantified formula ∃xA(x) with
A(ǫxA(x)), since under this interpretation these two formulas would be equiv-
alent. The universal quantifier is dealt with similarly: bearing in mind that
∀xA(x) ↔ ¬∃x¬A(x) over classical logic, we interpret ∀xA(x) as A(ǫx¬A(x)),
since ¬A(ǫx¬A(x)) holds only if ¬∀xA(x).
We now want to transform proofs in predicate logic to proofs in the epsilon
calculus. So what happens if we replace all instances of quantifiers in a proof
with the corresponding epsilon term? It turns out that the quantifier rules are
trivially eliminated with epsilon terms in place of quantifiers: If
...
A(x)→ B
∃xA(x)→ B
occurs in our proof then we simply replace the free variable x with ǫxA(x) and
we get a derivation
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...
A(ǫxA(x))→ B.
On the other hand, if we have an instance of the quantifier axiom
A(t)→ ∃xA(x)
we now need to introduce a new axiom which governs the corresponding
epsilon term, namely:
(∗) A(t)→ A(ǫxA(x)).
Axioms of the form (∗) are called critical axioms. In simple terms, the epsilon
calculus is the quantifier-free calculus we obtain by removing quantifiers and
their axioms and rules, and adding epsilon terms together with the critical
axioms. Note that for first-order theories like arithmetic things are already a bit
more complicated, but for now we have enough structure to give an epsilon-
style proof of the drinkers paradox!
Referring to our derivation in Figure 1, let us use the following abbrevia-
tions:
ǫk := ǫk¬P(k)
ǫm[n] := ǫm¬(P(n)→ P(m))
ǫn := ǫn(P(n)→ P(ǫm[n]))
whose meaning in the epsilon calculus is indicated below:
P(ǫk) ↔ ∃k¬P(k)
(P(n)→ P(ǫm[n]))↔ ∀m(P(n)→ P(m))
P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn]) ↔ ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m))
Note that the final formula is the drinkers paradox itself.
Figure 2 shows the translation of our first-order derivation of DP into one in
the epsilon calculus. The translation is quite straightforward, and uses nothing
more than the principles sketched above: For each quantifier rule we simple
replace the variable in question by the relevant epsilon term (and the rule
vanishes), whereas each quantifier axiom is interpreted by the corresponding
critical axiom, which is made explicit in Figure 2. The proof is shorter due to
the elimination of the quantifier rules, and the instance of LEM now applies to
the decidable predicate P(ǫk), and so is now computationally benign.
So far so good: We have transformed a proof in classical predicate logic to a
quantifier-free version in which the main logical content is now encoded in the
critical axioms. Can we get rid of these in some way in order to give the proof
a computational interpretation?
This is the role played by epsilon substitution, which forms the core of the
epsilon calculus technique. In short: Any first-order proof can only use finitely
many instances of the critical axioms. Therefore, if for all relevant formulasA(x)
which feature in the proof, we can find a concrete approximation for the epsilon
term ǫxA(x), which rather than satisfying all critical axioms A(t) → A(ǫxA(x)),
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¬P(ǫk)→ P(ǫk) → P(ǫm[ǫk])
C2
¬P(ǫk) → (P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn]))
P(ǫk) → P(0)→ P(ǫk)
C1
P(ǫk)→ (P(0)→ P(ǫm[0]))
C3
P(ǫk) → (P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn]))
¬P(ǫk) ∨ P(ǫk)→ (P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn])) ∨ (P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn]))
LEM
(P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn])) ∨ (P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn]))
ctr
P(ǫn)→ P(ǫm[ǫn])
Critical axioms:
C1 P(ǫk)→ P(ǫm[0])
C2 (P(ǫk) → P(ǫm[ǫk]))→ (P(ǫn)→ P(ǫm[ǫn]))
C3 (P(0)→ P(ǫm[0]))→ (P(ǫn)→ P(ǫm[ǫn]))
Figure 2: An informal epsilon-style derivation of DP
satisfy just those which are used in the proof, then we have a way of finding
explicit witnesses for existential statements. The epsilon substitution method
is an algorithm for eliminating critical formulas in this way.
It goes as follows: We first assign all relevant epsilon terms the canonical
value 0. We then examine our finite list of critical formulas until we find one
which fails. Thiswouldmean that there is some term formulaA and term t such
that A(t) is true but A(ǫxA(x)) false under our current assignment. But we can
now use the this information to repair our epsilon term, by setting ǫxA(x) := t,
which fromnow on serves as awitness for∃xA(x). The process is then repeated,
until all critical formulas have been repaired.
This may sound quite straightforward, but epsilon substitution is in fact a
complicated business! In the case of arithmetic, several erroneous algorithms
were initially proposed, before a correct technique involving transfinite induc-
tion up to ε0 was finally given by Ackermann in [2] - a modern treatment of
which is provided byMoser [33]. The difficulty with the substitution method is
primarily due to the presence of nested epsilon terms, whereby trying to fix one
critical axiom can suddenly invalidate several others which were previously
considered fixed, leading to a subtle backtracking procedure. Further details
of the general algorithm are far beyond the scope of this paper, but we are able
to provide a simple version for the case of the drinkers paradox!
First we should remark that in our proof, only two of our epsilon terms,
ǫk and ǫn, represent existential (as opposed to universal) quantifiers, so we
only attempt to find approximations for these (we explain this in more detail
below). Let us first try ǫk = ǫn = 0. Then C2 and C3 are trivially satisfied, but
not necessarily C1. In this case there are two possibilities: Either we get lucky
and P(0)→ P(ǫm[0]) holds, in which case we’re done, or our guess fails because
P(0) ∧ ¬P(ǫm[0]). We now learn from our failure and repair the broken epsilon
terms, setting ǫk := ǫm[0]. Now C1 holds and C3 remains the same as before,
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Interpretation: P(ǫn) → P(ǫm[ǫn])
Counter: the epsilon function ǫm[−]
Algorithm: Epsilon substitution
ǫk, ǫn := 0, 0

Query: P(0)→ P(ǫm[0])
YES

NO

ǫk, ǫn := ǫm[0], 0

END ǫk, ǫn := ǫm[0], ǫm[0]oo
Figure 3: Interpretation of DP via epsilon calculus
but under our new assignment C2 becomes
(P(ǫm[0])→ P(ǫm[ǫm[0]]))→ (P(0)→ P(ǫm[0]))
which from our assumption P(0) ∧ ¬P(ǫm[0]) is now false. So we repair this in
turn and set ǫn := ǫm[0]. A quick run through of each critical axiom under the
assignment ǫk = ǫn := ǫm[0] reveals that we’re done.
The substitutionmethod generalises this strategy of guessing, learning from
the failure of our guesses, and repairing. As such, despite its complexity, it offers
a beautifully clear computational semantics for classical logic: The building of
approximations to non-computational objects via a game of trial and error.
This has inspired a number of more modern approaches to program extraction,
which we will mention later.
As we already pointed out, there are no critical formulas for ǫm[n]. Rather,
this plays the role of a function variable, and our witness for ǫn is constructed
relative to this variable. Without wanting to go into more detail here, ǫm[n]
is a placeholder which represents how the drinkers paradox might be used as
a lemma in the proof of another theorem. As such, we do not have an ideal
witness for ∃n in the drinkers paradox, but rather an approximate witness
relative to ǫm[n]. We will see this phenomenon repeat itself throughout this
paper, where in each setting there will be a specific structure which plays the
role of a ‘counter argument’, which represents the universal quantifier and
against which our approximate witness is computed.
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We summarise our epsilon-style interpretation of DP in Figure 3, giving a
flowchart representation of the corresponding substitution algorithm.
3.2 Modified realizability
Before we move on to the world of realizability, let us consider the following
elegant interpretation of DP as a game between two players, who are tradi-
tionally named ∃loise and ∀belard. ∃loise’s goal is to establish the truth of DP
by choosing a witness for ∃n, whereas her opponent ∀belard is tasked with
disproving DP by producing a counter witness for ∀m. Fortunately for ∃loise,
the rules of the game dictate that she can backtrack and change her mind!
So how might the game go? ∃loise begins by picking an arbitrary witness
for ∃n, let’s say n := 0, thereby claiming that ∀m(P(0) → P(m)) is true. ∀belard
responds by playing some m with the aim of showing that ∃loise’s guess was
wrong. There are now two possibilities: Either P(0) → P(m) is true and ∃loise
was right all along, inwhich case shewins, or∀abelard’s challengewas success-
ful and P(0) ∧ ¬P(m) holds. But now ∃loise responds by simply changing her
mind and playing n := m. Now any further playm′ from ∀belard is destined to
fail since P(m)→ P(m′) will always be true!
What we have done is describe a winning strategy for ∃loise in a quantifier-
game corresponding to DP. That there is a correspondence between classical
validity and winning strategies in this sense is well-known and widely re-
searched, dating back to e.g. Novikoff in [35], and today game semantics is an
important topic in logic. Here it will form a useful sub-theme and will help
us characterise the behaviour of certain functionals which arise from classical
proofs.
Modified realizability is one of several forms of realizabilitywhich arose as a
concrete implementation of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmgorov (BHK) interpre-
tation of intuitionistic logic. Introduced by Kreisel in [28], modified realizabil-
ity works in a typed setting, and allows us to transform proofs in intuitionistic
arithmetic to terms in the typed lambda calculus.
As a clean and elegant formulation of the BHK interpretation in the typed
setting, variants of modified realizability have proven extremely popular tech-
niques for extracting programs from proofs. In particular, refinements of the
interpretation form the theoretical basis for the Minlog system [1], a proof as-
sistant which automates program extraction and is primarily motivated by the
synthesis of verified programs (see e.g. [11, 12] for examples of this). For a
comprehensive account of the interpretation itself, the reader is directed to e.g.
[23, Chapter 5] or [48, Chapter 7].
Similarly to the epsilon calculus, modified realizability consists of two com-
ponents: An interpretation and a soundness proof. The interpretation maps
each formula A in Heyting arithmetic to a new formula xmr A, where x is a
potentially empty tuple of variables whose length and type depends on the
structure of A. The interpretation is quite simple, so we state it in Figure 4.
The soundness proof for modified realizability states that whenever A is
provable in Heyting arithmetic, then there is some term t of System T (i.e. the
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xmr A :≡ A for prime formulas A
x, ymr A ∧ B :≡ xmr A ∧ ymr B
b, x, y,mr A ∨ B :≡ (b = 0→ xmr A) ∧ (b , 0 → ymr B)
f mr A → B :≡ ∀x(xmr A → f xmr B)
z, ymr ∃xA(x) ≡ ymr A(z)
f mr ∀xA(x) ≡ ∀x( f xmr A(x))
Figure 4: Modified realizability
typed lambda calculus of primitive recursive functionals in all finite types)
satisfying tmr A, which can moreover be formally extracted from the proof:
HA ⊢ A implies System T ⊢ tmr A
So far, what we have described applies only to intuitionistic theories, so we
need an additional step to extend the interpretation to classical logic. This
turns out to be rather subtle, and usually relies on a combination of the Go¨del-
Getzen negative translation together with some variant of the so-called Dra-
galin/Friedman/Leivant trick, also known as the A-translation. A detailed
discussion of this technique is beyond the scope of this paper, but we briefly
present a variant due to [13] and describe how it acts on DP.
First the negative translation. Negative translations are well-known meth-
ods for embedding classical logic in intuitionistic logic. There are several
variants of the translation, each of which involves strategically inserting dou-
ble negations in certain places in a logical formula in such a way that if A is
provable in classical logic, then AN is provable intuitionistically. In particular,
we would have
PA ⊢ A implies HA ⊢ AN
Negative translations are widely used and and the relationship between the
manyvarieties iswell understood (see [18] for a detailed study). Wedeliberately
avoid going intomore detail and specifying a translation to use here. We simply
state without justification that a suitable negative translation of the drinkers
paradox is the following:
DPN :≡ ¬¬∃n∀m(P(n)→ ¬¬P(m))
which is provable in intuitionistic (and in fact minimal) logic. Now to the A-
translation. The reasonweneed an intermediate step in addition to the negative
translation is that the negative translation alone results in a formula with no
computational meaning at all: Since ⊥ is a prime formula, we have
f mr ¬A ≡ ∀x(xmr A → ⊥)
i.e. f is just an empty tuple. In order to make realizability ‘sensitive’ to the
negative translation, we treat ⊥ as a new predicate, which in particular has a
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special realizability interpretation
xmr ⊥
where x has some predetermined type τ. With this adjustment we would have
f mr ¬A ≡ ∀x(xmr A → f xmr ⊥)
where f x has the non-empty type τ. Now that realizability interacts with
negated formulas, we are ready to go! The first step is to examine the negated
principle DPN, and carefully apply the clauses of Figure 4 together with the
special interpretation of ⊥.
We now do this in detail. We first assume that the decidable predicate P(n)
can be coded as a prime formula t(n) = 0 and thus has an empty realizer. So
starting with the inner formula it is not to difficult to work out that
f mr (P(n)→ ¬¬P(m)) ≡ P(n)→ ∀a((P(m)→ amr ⊥) → f amr ⊥)
where f : τ→ τ. The next step is to treat the quantifiers, and we end up with
e, gmr ∃n∀m(P(n) → ¬¬P(m))
≡ ∀m(gmmr (P(e)→ ¬¬P(m)))
≡ ∀m(P(e)→ ∀a((P(m)→ amr ⊥) → gmamr ⊥))︸                                                         ︷︷                                                         ︸
Q(e,g)
where for convenience we label this formula Q(e, g) as indicated. Note that
types of these realizers are given by e : N and g : N → τ → τ. Finally,
interpreting the whole formula yields
Φmr ¬¬∃n∀m(P(n)→ ¬¬P(m))
≡ ∀p(pmr ¬∃n∀m(P(n)→ ¬¬P(m))→ Φpmr ⊥)
≡ ∀p(∀e, g(Q(e, g)→ pegmr ⊥) → Φpmr ⊥)
(1)
where now p : σ and Φ : σ → τ for σ :=N→ (N→ τ→ τ)→ τ.
Just like we did not give a formal description of the epsilon substitution
method, wewill not present in detail how a concrete functionalΦ satisfying the
above is rigorously extracted from the proof of the negative translation of DP.
Rather, we simply present a term which does the trick and carefully explain
why. Let’s define
Φp := p0hp where hp := λm
N, aτ
(
a if P(0)→ P(m) else pm(λnN, bτ.b)
)
.
We need to prove that Φ satisfies (1) above. In order to do this, we have to
simultaneously unwind (1) together with the definition of Φ. Our goal is to
show that Φpmr ⊥ whenever p satisfies the premise of (1). So let’s assume the
latter, i.e.
∀e, g(Q(e, g)→ pegmr ⊥) (2)
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Interpretation: Φmr ¬¬∃n∀m(P(n)→ ¬¬P(m))
Counter: ∀belard i.e. λm, a in Φ
Algorithm: Unwinding Φpmr ⊥
p0hp mr ⊥
∃loise plays e, g := 0, hp

Q(0, hp)
∀belard plays m, a

P(0)→ (P(m)→ amr ⊥) → hpm0 mr ⊥

Query: P(0)→ P(m)
YES
		
NO

pm(λn, b.b) mr ⊥
∃loise plays e, g := m, λn, b.b

Q(m, λn, b.b)
∀belard plays n, b

END P(m)→ (P(n)→ bmr ⊥) → bmr ⊥oo
Figure 5: Modified realizability interpretation of DP
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and first instantiate e, g := 0, hp, which gives us
Q(0, hp) → p0hp︸︷︷︸
=Φp
mr ⊥
It is now enough to show that Q(0, hp) holds, since then we have Φpmr ⊥ as
indicated. Referring back to the definition of Q(e, g) above, this in turn boils
down to showing that, for any m, a:
P(0)→ (P(m)→ amr ⊥) → hpmamr ⊥. (3)
There are now two cases. In the first, P(0) → P(m) holds, which means that
hpma = a and so (3) becomes
P(0)→ (P(m)→ amr ⊥)→ amr ⊥.
This is now true, since either P(0) is false and it follows trivially or P(m) holds,
and so amr ⊥ follows from the assumption P(m)→ amr ⊥.
In the secondcasewehaveP(0)∧¬P(m),whichmeans thathpma = pm(λn, b.n)
and (3) becomes
P(0)→ (P(m)→ amr ⊥) → pm(λn, b.b) mr ⊥,
which appears less simple to validate. But the trick is to now go back to our
main assumption (2), this time instantiating e, g := m, λn, b.n. We are now done
so long as Q(m, λn, b.b) holds, which written out properly is
P(m)→ (P(n)→ bmr ⊥) → bmr ⊥.
But this now trivially true for any n, b since by assumption we have ¬P(m)!
Therefore climbing back up: We have established pm(λn, b.b) mr ⊥ and hence
hpmamr ⊥, which in turn proves Q(0, hp) and thus p0hp mr ⊥.
At first glance, the verification of our realizer looks somewhat convoluted,
jumping back and forth between our various hypothesis until one by one they
have been discharged. However, things become much clearer if we visualise
the above argument in terms of the game sketched at the beginning of the
section.
Let’s look at it again, this time giving each step a game-theoretic reading.
In order to verify Φpmr ⊥ we set e, g := 0, hp in (2), which can be seen as a
first attempt by ∃loise to prove DP. In this context, ∀belard’s job is to disprove
Q(0, hp), which he does by choosing some m, a and hoping that (3) fails. Either
P(0)→ P(m) is true, in which case (3) holds and ∃loise wins, or ∀belard chose a
good counterexample and P(0) ∧ ¬P(m). ∃loise now appeals to the premise of
(2) a second time, setting e, g := m, λn, b.n, and wins unless Q(m, λn, b.b) can be
shown false. But under our assumption ¬P(m) this is impossible, and so ∃loise
has a winning strategy.
What is interesting here is how the winning strategy is encoded by the com-
ponents of our term Φ: ∃loise’s moves are arguments for the term p, whereas
∀belard’s move is represented by the internal function abstraction λm, a.
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The reader interested in exploring the the connection between realizability,
negative translations and games could take [16] as a starting point. A fasci-
nating illustration of this phenomenon in the case of the axiom of choice is
provided by [9], which also inspired my own work in [44].
We finish off this section, as before, with a diagrammatic representation of
the algorithm which underlies this realizability interpretation of DP. Note that
where for the epsilon calculus the epsilon function ǫm[−] played the role of the
‘counter’, here the same thing is represented by the player ∀belard, or more
precisely, the function abstraction within our term Φ.
3.3 Dialectica interpretation
We now come to our final computational interpretation of classical logic:
Go¨del’s functional, or Dialectica interpretation. The name ‘Dialectica’ refers
to the journal in which the interpretation was first published in 1958 [20],
though the interpretation had been conceived as early as the 1930s, and had
been presented in lectures from the early 1940s. An English translation of the
original article can be found in Volume II of the Collected Works [21], which is
preceded by an illuminating introduction by Troelstra.
The original purpose of the Dialectica interpretation was to produce a rel-
ative consistency proof for Peano arithmetic. The interpretation maps the
first-order theory of arithmetic to the primitive recursive functionals in finite
types, thereby showing that the consistency of the former follows from that of
the latter. The interpretation was soon extended to full classical analysis by
Spector, in another groundbreaking article [50], which is also a fascinating read
due to the extensive footnotes from Kreisel, who put together and completed
the paper following Spector’s early death in 1961.
Much like the epsilon calculus, then, the Dialectica interpretation has its
origins in Hilbert’s program and the problem of consistency, though in contrast
it has achieved great success as a tool in modern applied proof theory, being
central to theproofminingprogram initiatedbyKreisel in the 1960s andbrought
to maturity by Kohlenbach from the 1990s.
For a comprehensive introduction to the interpretation the reader is directed
to the Avigad and Feferman’s Handbook chapter [7] or the textbook of Kohlen-
bach [23], particularly Chapters 8-10. The latter is also the standard reference
for applications of the Dialectica interpretation in mathematics (and applied
proof theory in general).
The basic set up of the interpretation bears a close resemblance to modified
realizability, although there are crucial differences between the two. The Di-
alectica assigns to each formula A of Heyting arithmetic a new formula of the
form ∃x∀y|A|xy, where |A|
x
y is quantifier-free and x and y are tuples of variables
whose length and type depend on the structure of A. The inner part of the
interpretation is defined by induction on formulas, which we give in Figure 6
below.
When one first sees the definition of the Dialectica interpretation, it is imme-
diate that it departs from the usual BHK style on which realizability is based,
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|A|xy :≡ A for prime formulas A
|A ∧ B|x,uy,v :≡ |A|
x
y ∧ |B|
u
v
|A ∨ B|b
N ,x,u
y,v :≡ (b = 0 → |A|
x
y) ∧ (b , 0→ |B|
u
v)
|A→ B|
f ,g
x,v :≡ |A|
x
gxv → |B|
f x
v
|∃zA(z)|z,xy :≡ |A(z)|
x
y
|∀zA(z)|
f
z,y :≡ |A(z)|
f z
y
Figure 6: The Dialectica interpretation
and the interpretation of implication in particular seems rather ad-hoc until
one understands where it comes from! The point here is that Dialectica inter-
pretation acts as a kind of Skomelisation, pulling all the quantifiers to the front
of the formula but preserving logical validity, so that
A ↔ ∃x∀y|A|xy
provably in theusual higher-type formulationof classical logic plus a quantifier-
free form of choice.
For most of the logical connectives, there is one obvious way of defining
the interpretation. However, in the case of implication we have several ways
of pulling the quantifiers out to the front, which make use of classical logic to a
greater or lesser degree. Go¨del chose the option which Skolemises implication
in the ‘least non-constructive way’, using only Markov’s principle and a weak
independence of premise. A detailed explanation of all this is given in [7,
Section 2.3] and [23, pp. 127–129]. I highlight it here because the treatment of
implication can often seem mystifying until one sees that it is defined the way
it is for a reason!
Aswithmodified realizability, the Dialectica interpretation comes equipped
with a soundness proof: If A is provable in Heyting arithmetic then there is
some term t of System T satisfying ∀y|A|ty, and moreover, this term can be
extracted from the proof of A:
HA ⊢ A implies System T ⊢ ∀y|A|ty.
We are now in a similar situation to the last section: We have a computational
interpretation of intuitionistic arithmetic, whichwenowneed to extend in some
way to deal with classical logic. It turns out that the same trick works: We just
combine the Dialectica interpretation with the negative translation. But cru-
cially, for the Dialectica we do not need an intermediate step corresponding to
theA-translation, since negated formulas are already considered computational
thanks to the interpretation of implication: We have
¬A is interpreted as ∃g∀x|A → ⊥|
g
x ≡ ∃g∀x(|A|
x
gx → ⊥) (4)
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On top of this, the Dialectica allows us to simplify our negative translated
formulas considerably. If A is a prime formula then
¬¬A is interpreted as ¬¬Awhich is intuitionistically equivalent to A
Thereforewhen interpreting a complicated formula we can continually remove
inner double negations which apply only to quantifier-free inner parts, which
saves us a lot of effort!
The reader may wonder why we didn’t go ahead and do this in the case of
modified realizability. This is another consequence of not needing to treat ⊥
as a special symbol: The variant of the A translation we gave uses implicitly
that DPN is provable in minimal logic, in which case we can replace ⊥ with
anything and the proof still goes through. However, the removal of double
negations before quantifier-free formulas requires ex-falso quodlibet and hence
the simplified form of DPN we will consider below cannot be dealt with by the
A translation. For more on this rather subtle point see [23, Chapter 14].
So let’s now focus on how the Dialectica interpretation deals with DP, or
more specifically, its negative translation,wewhich alreadygave in theprevious
section as
¬¬∃n∀m(P(n)→ ¬¬P(m)).
As discussed above, the first remarkable difference with realizability is that the
inner double negation essentially vanishes. Since P(n)→ ¬¬P(m) is quantifier-
free, it can be encoded as a prime formula and we have
(P(n)→ ¬¬P(m)) is interpreted as (P(n)→ ¬¬P(m))↔ (P(n)→ P(m))
since in Heyting arithmetic ¬¬P(m) ↔ P(m). Therefore, looking at how the
Dialectica interprets quantifiers and removing our inner double negation in
this way, we have that
∃n∀m(P(n) → ¬¬P(m)) is interpreted as ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m))
Therefore in order to deal with DPN, we need to interpret a formula of the
form ¬¬B where B :≡ ∃n∀m(P(n) → P(m)) is an ∃∀ formula. It’s here that the
interpretation of implication comes into play. To interpret the outer negations,
let’s first look at ¬B. Following (4), this is interpreted as
∃g∀n¬(P(n)→ P(gn))
and therefore negating a second time, the interpretation of ¬¬B is given by
∃Φ∀g¬¬(P(Φg)→ P(g(Φg)))↔ ∃Φ∀g(P(Φg)→ P(g(Φg)))
Putting this all together, we have that the Dialectica interpretation of the nega-
tive translationofDP is,modulo the eliminationof inessential double negations,
the following:
∃Φ∀g(P(Φg)→ P(g(Φg)). (5)
16
¬P(k) → P(k)→ P(m)
∀r
∀m(¬P(k)→ P(k)→ P(m))
∃ax
∀g(¬P(k)→ P(k) → P(gk))
∃r
∀k, g(¬P(k)→ P(k) → P(gk))
P(m)→ P(0)→ P(m)
∀ax
P(m)→ P(0)→ P(m)
∀r
∀m(P(m)→ P(0)→ P(m))
∃ax
∀g(P(g0)→ P(0)→ P(g0))
∀g(¬P(g0)∨ P(g0)→ (P(g0)→ P(g(g0)))∨ (P(0)→ P(g0)))
LEM
∀g((P(g0)→ P(g(g0)))∨ (P(0)→ P(g0)))
ctr
∀g(P(Φg)→ P(g(Φg)))
Figure 7: An informal extraction of Φ
Our challenge is to find a functional Φwhich satisfies (5). It turns out that such
a functional is a lot easier to write down than that formodified realizability, and
so this time we want to hint - very informally nevertheless - at how such a term
can be extracted from the semi-formal proof given in Figure 1, as it highlights
some important features of the soundness of the Dialectica interpretation.
The main idea is to extract our functionalΦ recursively over the structure of
the proof. Roughly speaking this goes as follows: There are twomain branches
of the proof, which are then combined using excluded-middle to yield two
potential witnesses, which are reduced to an exact witness via contraction,
which computationally speaking induces a case distinction.
Let’s first focus on the left-hand branch, which establishes
∃k¬P(k)→ ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m)).
The functional interpretation of the negative translation of the above is equiv-
alent to
∃Ψ1∀k, g(¬P(k)→ P(Ψ1kg) → P(g(Ψ1kg)))
which is very easily satisfied byΨ1kg := k i.e.
∀k, g(¬P(k)→ P(k)→ P(gk))
Now we turn to the right-hand branch, which establishes
∀kP(k) → ∃n∀m(P(n)→ P(m))
This is interpreted as
∃Ψ2,Ψ3∀g(P(Ψ3g)→ P(Ψ2g)→ P(g(Ψ2g)))
which is also easily satisfied byΨ2g = 0 andΨ3g = g0 i.e.
∀g(P(g0)→ P(0)→ P(g0))
We now mimic the combining of the two branches by setting k := g0 (note that
this would formally correspond to several steps). We obtain
∀g(¬P(g0)∨ P(g0)→ (P(g0)→ P(g(g0)))∨ (P(0)→ P(g0)))
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and so eliminating the now quantifier-free instance of LEM we end up with
∀g((P(g0)→ P(g(g0)))∨ (P(0)→ P(g0))).
The final instance of contraction is dealt with by carrying out a definition-by-
cases: Setting
Φg := 0 if P(0)→ P(g0) else g0
we have
∀g(P(Φg)→ P(g(Φg)))
and so we’re done. Of course, with a little thought we could have come up
with such a program without going through the formal extraction. However,
we want to illustrate how the construction of realizersmimics the formal proof,
which we sketch via our proof tree in Figure 7. Note that, technically speaking,
the application of the negative translation to the proof in Figure 1 would result
in a new, bigger proof tree which establishes DPN, and over which our realizer
would be extracted. However, for readabilitywe conflate this heavily in Figure
7, since it’s only the main structure we want to highlight.
Figure 8 gives our usual summary of the algorithm underlying the interpre-
tation. In this case it is quite succinct: Our functional Φ is nothing more than
a straightforward case distinction and our ‘counter’ is just a simple function g.
In this way, our interpretation is neither embellished by a nested function calls
as in modified realizability, or with an explicit backtracking algorithm as for
the epsilon calculus.
Interpretation: ∃Φ∀g(P(Φg)→ P(g(Φg)))
Counter: the function g
Algorithm: Evaluation of Φg
Query: P(0)→ P(g0)
YESΦg=0

NO Φg=g0
  
END
Figure 8: Dialectica interpretation of DP
3.4 Final remarks
It will hopefully not have escaped the reader that in the simple case of the
drinkers paradox, all three interpretations arrive at essentially the same basic
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algorithm:
• Try a default value n := 0;
• Query the truth value of P(0) → P(m) where m is some counter value
obtained from the environment;
• In the case of failure, update n := m.
This useful feature of the drinkers paradox allows us to focus on the very
differentways inwhich each interpretation describes the underlying algorithm.
Notably, the interaction with a counter value is present in each of the above
examples, but encoded using a variety of structures, from a simple function in
the case of the Dialectica to an internal abstraction in the case of modified real-
izability. At this point, it is perhaps worth pausing a moment to discuss these
differences and the way in which they have affected how each interpretation
has been used since Hilbert’s program.
4 Interlude: A general perspective on proof interpretations
It may seem remarkable that as we slowly approach a century since the emer-
gence of the epsilon calculus, a comprehensive comparison and assessment
of the well-established computational interpretations of classical logic is still
lacking - though a number of studies in this direction (such as [51]) have been
produced.
Comparing proof interpretations is difficult. For a start, they are acutely sen-
sitive to the way in which they are applied: An unnecessary double negation
that would be routinely removed by a human applying a proof interpretation
by hand could result in a considerable blow-up in complexity for a program
formally extracted by a machine. Thus the Dialectica interpretation as a tool
in proof mining is different to the Dialectica interpretation as an extraction
mechanism in a proof assistant. Closely related to this is the fact that proof
interpretations are in a constant state of flux, undergoing adaptations and re-
finements in quite specific directions as they become established as tools in
contrasting areas of application. So when comparing, for instance, the Dialec-
tica to modified realizability, we have to quite carefully specify which of the
many variants we have in mind.
Another problem lies in deciding the nature of the comparison we wish to
make. For example, it is clear that in terms of their definitions, modified real-
izability and dialectica belong very much to the same family of interpretations
(an impression which is made precise in [36]), whereas the epsilon calculus
is different species altogether. Nevertheless, in terms of the programs they
produce for DP, it can be argued that the Dialectica has more in common with
the epsilon calculus than it does with realizability. Without wanting to read
too much into our simple case study, the point is simply that there is more to
a proof interpretation than meets the eye, and a similarity in the definitional
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structure of two interpretations is not necessarily reflected when one examines
the programs they produce.
As such, it is difficult to make sweeping claims about the relationship be-
tween proof interpretations without a certain amount of qualification. Never-
theless, it is undoubtedly the case that over the years, each of the three interpre-
tations of classical logic mentioned above has developed a reputation, closely
tied to the domains in which they primarily feature, and moreover posses cer-
tain characteristics which make them appealing for certain applications, and
less appealing for others.
Perhaps the most striking feature of Hilbert’s epsilon calculus is that it con-
tains, implicitly, an elegant computational explanation of classical reasoning.
Classical logic allows us to construct ‘ideal objects’ which are represented by
epsilon terms, and the substitution methods shows us how to build approxima-
tions to these objects via a formof trial and error. In thisway, the epsilon calculus
can be seen as a direct precursor to much later work such as Coquand’s game
semantics [16], Avigad’s update procedures [6], the Aschieri/Berardi learning-
based realizability [5] andmuchmore besides, which are all concerned in some
way with a computational semantics of classical arithmetic via backtracking,
or learning, a topic which we explore in more detail later.
All of this aside, the epsilon calculus plays active role in structural proof
theory, where it has deep links with cut elimination [30], and the variants of the
substitution method are still studied, particularly with regards to complexity
issues [34]. More recently, the syntactic representation of quantifiers offered by
the epsilon terms has been utilised by proof assistants such as Isabelle andHOL
[19]. Epsilon terms also feature in philosophy and linguistics, and the reader
interested in this is encouraged to consult the many references provided in [8].
However, when it comes to concrete applications for the purpose of program
extraction in mathematics or computer science, the epsilon calculus has been
far superseded by the functional interpretations, which dominate this area for
a number of reasons.
One property which the functional interpretations share is that the classical
interpretations both factor through a natural intuitionistic counterpart. While
the epsilon calculus applies directly to classical logic, the functional interpre-
tations deal with this separately via the negative translation. For many appli-
cations of program extraction, particularly those which lean towards formal
verification, the underlying proofs are indeed purely intuitionistic, in which
case it makes far more sense to work with a direct implementation of the BHK
interpretation such as modified realizability.
Another important feature of the functional interpretations is that the pro-
grams they extract are expressed as simple and clean lambda terms rather than
an intricate transfinite recursion, as in the substitution method (though trans-
finite recursion is of course present in System T, it is conveniently encoded
using the higher type recursors). In particular, lambda terms can be viewed
in a very direct sense as functional programs, and are easily translated into
real functional language like Haskell or ML. Therefore when it comes to the
formal extraction of functional programs from intuitionistic proofs, variants of
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modified realizability are an obvious choice, and their success in this area is
proven by the wide range of applications, ranging from real number compu-
tation [12] to the synthesis of SAT solvers [11] (see the Minlog page at [1] for
further examples).
For applications of proof interpretations in mathematics, in the sense of
the proof mining program [23], it is the Dialectica interpretation that has the
starring role. Since applications of this kind typically deal with classical logic,
theywould in principlewould also be suited to the epsilon calculus, and indeed
early examples of proofminingmadeuse of epsilon substitution [27]. However,
the fact that the Dialectica interpretation extracts functional programs is also
crucial for modern proof mining, due to the direct use ofmathematical properties
of those functionals.
In proof mining, the Dialectica interpretation is typically used in its mono-
tone variant,which technically speaking is a combination of the usualDialectica
interpretation with a bounding relation on functionals known as majorizabil-
ity. It is precisely this combination of proof interpretation and majorizability
which enables the extraction highly uniform, low complexity bounds from
proofs which use what at first glance appear to be computationally intractable
analytical principle such as Heine-Borel compactness. For much more detailed
discussion on the role the Dialectica interpretation plays in proof mining, see
[24]. The main point to take away here is that the ‘functional’ part of functional
interpretations is a crucial part of their success!
In the inevitably simplistic picture I have drawn above, I have deliberately
contrasted the algorithmic elegance of the epsilon calculuswith the applicability
of the functional interpretations. A natural question is whetherwe can combine
these two features in someway. This forms the main narrative of the remainder
of the paper.
As we have seen, the functional interpretations deal with classical logic
somewhat indirectly via negative translations. While in the case of realizability
this can often be given a nice presentation in terms of games, in the case of the
Dialectica interpretation in particular, the algorithm which is contained in the
normalization of the term extracted from a negated proof is often very difficult
to understand, and this is particularly the case once one moves away from
simple examples like the drinkers paradox and analyzes ‘real’ theorems from
mathematics, where complex and abstract forms of recursion start to play a
role.
Of the three interpretations, it is the Dialectica which has featured most
prominently in my own research. I was drawn to it by its importance to the
proof mining program, and the rich variety of mathematical theorems which
have been studied using this interpretation, to which I also made a few small
contributions.
In my own case studies [37, 38, 39, 41, 42] which focused on relatively
strong theorems frommathematical analysis andwell quasi-order theory, I was
surprised byhow the operational behaviour of the extracted termswere initially
quite difficult to understand, but after carefully analysing them it became clear
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that they implemented rather clever backtracking algorithms. This led me to
start thinking about the relationship between the Dialectica and the epsilon
calculus, or more specifically, to ask whether terms extracted by the Dialectica
in certain settings could be characterised as an epsilon-style procedures.
Although nowadays the epsilon calculus has become something of a spe-
cialised topic, in the past it was very much in the minds of those who pi-
oneered applied proof theory. Early case studies by Kreisel were based on
the substitution method, which in particular was used to prove soundness of
the no-counterexample interpretation [26, 27], a close relative of the Dialectica
interpretation (but see [22]).
Particularly fascinating for me is the possibility that, while working on his
groundbreaking extension of the Dialectica to full classical analysis, Spector
was already thinking of a new way to deal with the axiom of choice using an
epsilon-style algorithm. In his first footnote to [50], Kreisel writes of the draft
of the paper he received from Spector before the latter’s death:
This last half page states that the proof of the Go¨del translation of axiom F
would use a generalization of Hilbert’s substitution method as illustrated
in the special case of §12.1. However Spector’s notes do not contain any
details, so that it is not quite clear how to reconstruct the proof he had in
mind.
Here axiom F is essentially the negative translation of the axiom of countable
choice, which Spector had already interpretedusing his schema of bar recursion
in all finite types. While we do not know precisely what Spector intended, the
idea of trying to replace the complicated forms of recursion which underlie
the Dialectica with something more transparent is of great relevance now that
proof interpretations are primarily used for practical program extraction as
opposed to consistency proofs, and I talk about some more recent research in
this direction in Section 5.1.
The search for a clear algorithmic representation of terms extracted by the
Dialectica led me to think, more generally, of how one could utilise concepts
from the theory of programming languages to help capture what is going on
‘underneath the bonnet’ of theDialectica. To this end Iworked on incorporating
the notion of a global state into the interpretation via the state monad, and I
discuss stateful programs in a much broader context in Section 5.2.
5 Epsilon style algorithms and the Dialectica interpretation
In Section 3 I presented three old and well established computational inter-
pretations of classical logic, by sketching how they act in the simple case of
the drinkers paradox. My stress here was on the historical context in which
they arose, and on highlighting key features of the interpretations which help
explain the roles they play in modern proof theory.
My goal in this section is to focus more closely on the connection between
them, and more specifically, to demonstrate how the core idea underlying the
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epsilon calculus can help us better understand the Dialectica interpretation. As
such, I consider two concepts in which epsilon substitution style algorithms
can be elegantly phrased, but which are both much more general: Learning
algorithms and stateful programs.
I have used each of these to study the Dialectica interpretation, in [45] and
[46] respectively, and these studies will form the main narrative of this section.
Nevertheless, learning andprogrammingwith state featuremuchmore broadly
inmodern approaches to program extraction, and I was certainly not the first to
utilise them in this way. Thereforemypriority here is to explain both in suitably
general terms that their application in a broader context can be appreciated.
5.1 Learning algorithms
Aswehave seen, the notionof learning as a computational semantics of classical
logic in already explicitly present in the epsilon calculus, and can actually be
seen in each of the interpretations of the drinkers paradox in Section 3. In
fact, over the years this idea has continually resurfaced in a variety of different
settings, some of which have already been mentioned (and a detailed survey
of which would be an extensive work in its own right).
In this section, I will introduce a specific form of learning phrased in the
language of all finite types, which I found useful in clarifying certain aspects
of the Dialectica interpretation in [45], characterising extracted programs as
epsilon-style procedures. I will briefly sketch how this relates to the drinkers
paradox, but here our running example is far less illuminating, and so I will go
on to present a Skolem formDPω of the drinkers paradox,which is solved using
a simple kind of learning procedure that appears frequently in the literature.
Computational interpretations of classical logic via learning are particularly
meaningful when one focuses on ∀∃∀-formulas. By a simple adaptation of our
argument in Section 3.3 we see that the combination of the negative translation
and dialectica interpretation carries out the following transformation on such
formulas:
∀a∃x∀yQ(a, x, y) 7→ ∃Φ∀a, gQ(a,Φag, g(Φag))
which happens to also coincide with Kreisel’s no-counterexample interpreta-
tion for formulas of this type. Here, we can visualise Φag as constructing an
approximation to the non-constructive object x in the following precise sense:
Rather than demanding some x such thatQ(a, x, y) is valid for all y, we compute
for any given g an x such that Q(a, x, gx) holds.
Such reformulations of ∀∃∀-theorems are widely studied in proof mining:
In the case of convergence they go under the name of ‘metastability’. Here
x is a number, and one is typically concerned with producing a computable
bound for the approximation of x i.e. ∀a, g∃x ≤ ΦagQ(a, x, gx) (see [25] for an
interesting discussion of this and several related concepts). However, x could
be amore complicated object, such as amaximal ideal or a choice sequence, and
in this case approximations to x are often built using a complex forms of higher-
order recursion whose normalization is subtle andwhose operational meaning
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can be difficult to intuit, but which can be cleanly and elegantly presented as
learning procedures.
So what is a learning procedure? In my own version of this well-known
idea [45], I start with the idea of a learning algorithm. A learning algorithm is
assigned a type ρ, τ, and, roughly speaking, seeks to build approximations to
an object of type ρ using building blocks of type τ. Formally, it is given by a
tuple L = (Q, ξ,⊕) where the components are to be understood as follows:
• Q is a predicate on ρwhich tells us if a suitably ‘good’ approximation has
been found;
• ξ : ρ → τ is a function which takes a current approximation x and returns
a new building block ξ(x);
• ⊕ : ρ × τ → ρ combines xwith a building block y to form a new approxi-
mation x ⊕ y.
Given any initial object x0, a learning algorithm triggers a learning procedure
x0, x1, x2, . . ., which is defined recursively by
xi+1 =

xi if Q(xi)
xi ⊕ ξ(xi) otherwise
The basic idea is very simple. At each stage in the procedurewe check whether
or not xi is a good approximation. If it is, we leave it unchanged, if not,
we assume that by its failure we have learned a new piece of information ξ(xi),
whichwe can use to update the approximation xi+1 = xi⊕ξ(xi). We are typically
interested in learning algorithms whose learning procedures terminate at some
point, by which we mean there is some k such that Q(xk) holds. In this case we
say that xk is the limit of the procedure and write limL[x] := xk.
The dialectica interpretation of the drinkers paradox can be solved by an
extremely simple learning algorithm of length at most two: Given our counter
function g we define L by
Q(x) = P(x)→ P(gx) ξ = g x ⊕ y = y
and it is easy to see thatΨg := limL[0] works. Of course this is essentially the
same as the program
Φg = 0 if P(0)→ P(g0) else g0,
but here the learning that we see in the epsilon calculus is made explicit. For
the sake of completeness, we give the summary of the algorithm in Figure 9.
Unsurprisingly, learning algorithms in [45] were not introduced to help
better understand the drinkers paradox, but to give an algorithmic description
of how complicated objects such as choice sequences are built, which is more
or less the role they play elsewhere in the literature. The main part of my own
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Algorithm: limL[0]
x0 := 0

Query: P(x0) → P(gx0)
YES
vv♠♠♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
♠
NO

END Update: x1 := x0 ⊕ gx0 = gx0oo
Figure 9: Interpretation of DP via learning procedure
paper is in fact the study of learning algorithms on infinite sequences, which
are rather subtle and involve non-trivial termination arguments.
To give a the reader a flavour of a meaningful learning procedure, let’s take
instead of a single predicate P a sequence (Pn) of decidable predicates, and
consider the following sequential form of the drinkers paradox:
DPω : ∃ fN→N∀n,m(Pn( f n) → Pn(m))
which is provable using classical logic in conjunction with the axiom of count-
able choice. The Dialectica interpretation of the negative translation of this
(before bringing the ∃ f out to the front) is given by
∀ω,φ∃ f (Pω f ( f (ω f )) → Pω f (φ f ))
where ω,φ are functionals of type (N → N) → N. In other words, we need
to build an approximation to the Skolem function f which works, not for all n
and y, but just for ω f and φ f . We can construct such an f in ω,φ by taking the
limit of the learning algorithm L[λi.0] for L of typeN→N,N ×N given by
• Q( f ) := Pω f ( f (ω f )) → Pω f (φ f )
• ξ( f ) := (ω f , φ f )
• f ⊕ (n, x) := f [n 7→ x]
where f [n 7→ x] is the function f updated with the value x at argument n. It’s
immediately clear that once the underlying learning procedure terminateswith
some f satisfying Q( f ) then we’re done, as this this is just the definition of a
realizer for the functional interpretation of DPω. What is less clear is what the
procedure does and why it terminates!
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The learning procedure generates a sequence of functions
f0, f1, f2, . . .
where fi+1 = fi[ni 7→ xi] (we write (ni, xi) := (ω fi, φ fi) for simplicity). Whenever
our current attempt fi fails i.e. ¬Q( fi) holds, we know in particular that¬Pni (xi),
and so we have learned something about our predicates Pi. Updating fi+1 =
f [ni 7→ xi] means that fi+1 is now a valid choice sequence at point ni, since
Pni (xi) → Pni (y) for all y. Looking at the procedure as a whole, it’s clear that
fi+1 is in fact a valid choice sequence for all of n0, . . . , ni, and so our learning
procedure can be viewed as building an increasingly accurate approximation
to the ideal choice function f .
Now we need to impose a condition on ω and φ, namely that they are
continuous, whichmeans that they only look at a finite part of their input. This is
not an unreasonable assumption, since all computable functionals in particular
are continuous, but it nevertheless means that our learning procedure cannot
be defined as a term of System T, which is a good indication of the fact that we
are going beyond the usual soundness theorem for theDialectica interpretation,
since DPω is not provable in Peano arithmetic.
For each n, the sequence f0(n), f1(n), f2(n), . . . changes atmost once, and thus
the functions f0, f1, f2, . . . tend to some limit. By continuity ofω, this means that
ω f0, ω f1, ω f2, . . . eventually becomes constant, and so at some point j we must
have n j+1 = ω f j+1 ∈ {n0, . . . , n j} and so in particular ¬Pn j+1( f j+1(n j+1)), which
implies Q( f j+1), and hence termination of the procedure. A diagram of the
learning procedure as a whole is given in Figure 10.
Algorithm: limL[λn.0]
f0 := λn.0
j:=0

Set: (n j, y j) := (ω f j, φ f j)

END Query: Pn j ( f j(n j)) → Pn j (y j)
YESoo
NO

Update: f j+1 := f j ⊕ (n j, y j)
j:= j+1
ii
Figure 10: Interpretation of DPω via learning procedure
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The reader will hopefully have noticed that our learning procedure is noth-
ingmore than a simple version of epsilon substitution, formulated in the higher-
order language of the Dialectica interpretation and used to produce a realizer
for the Dialectica interpretation of a choice principle! We imagine the function
f in DPω as finding some element such that¬Pi(m) holds, if it exists, and as such
identify f nwith ǫm¬Pn(m). Our learning procedure starts by setting f n = 0 for
all n, and then, via a process of trial and error, repeatedly corrects the function
until a sufficiently good approximation has been found. The current critical
formula is given by Q( f ).
The idea of solving DPω in this way can already be found in §12.1 of Spector
[50], and it is precisely this that he claims to have generalised to solve the
functional interpretation of full countable choice. While his proof was never
recovered, learning procedureshave since emerged in several places, andmany
works on this topic can be characterised as the study of more complicated
versions of this idea.
My own work in this direction has been primarily concerned with the Di-
alectica interpretation itself and the development of Spector’s idea. In [45] I
study a more general class of learning procedure, and show in particular that
Spector’s bar recursion can be seen as a kind of ‘forgetful’ learning procedure.
I extend this idea in [47], exploiting the connection established in [43] between
bar recursion and Berger’s open recursion [10], and devise learning procedure
which solves the Dialectica interpretation of a simple form of Zorn’s lemma.
However, the relationship between classical logic and learning has also been
developed by other authors in different contexts. To give a few examples: In
[9], a variation of the algorithm above is captured in a realizability setting via
a form of recursion in higher-types now known as the BBC functional, which
has since been studied in greater depth in [10]. In [6], learning procedures are
called update procedures, and are used to prove the 1-consistency of arithmetic.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in [5] and later works by these
authors (see in particular [3, 4]), a special form of realizability is developed
which is is based entirely on the notion of learning. Here, learning is captured
through a ‘state of knowledge’, which contains a finitary approximation to a
Skolem function. Realizers for existential statements are evaluated relative to
this state, and they either succeed, or discover an error in the current state, in
which case the state is updated and the process repeats. In this, more than
any of the other works mentioned here, learning is characterised as a stateful
program, which brings me to the final part of the paper.
5.2 Stateful programs
Learning procedures are illuminating precisely because they capture the com-
putational content of classical reasoning on an algorithmic level, through the
evolution of a state. The idea of a computation as an action on a state is the
foundation of the imperative programming paradigm, on which many major
programming languages - including C++, Java andPython - are partially based.
This begs a much broader question: Can we utilise ideas from the theory of
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imperative languages to more clearly and elegantly express the computational
meaning of classical reasoning?
This point of view has been explored primarily in the French style of pro-
gram extraction via e.g. Krivine realizability, in which there is a greater ten-
dency to capture the computational content of classical logic via control op-
erators such as call/cc, rather than through logical techniques like negative
translations (see [31] for an interesting discussion of this).
However, my emphasis here is somewhat different: Namely on adapting
traditional proof interpretations like the Dialectica so that the operational be-
haviour of extracted programs can be better understood. The benefits for this
are great: theDialectica has undoubtedly the richest catalogue of applications of
all proof interpretations, and so a characterisation of extracted terms as stateful
programs could lead to fascinating connections between imperative languages
and non-constructive principles from everyday mathematics.
This final section discusses ideas in this direction. My main goal will be to
indicate how stateful programs can be simulated in a functional setting, and
describe how they can be used to enrich the Dialectica interpretation and give
it a more imperative flavour. Though this takes as its inspiration both the
epsilon substitution and the learning procedures just presented, work of this
kind is more general and focused on breaking down proof interpretations on
a much lower level. It is also far less developed, with only a few recent works
which view the traditional interpretations from this perspective, and as such
this section can be seen as an extended conclusion, looking ahead to future
research.
I should start by clarifying the difference between imperative and functional
programs. Simply put, imperative programs are built using commands which
act on some underlying state. A while loop can be seen as a simple program
written in an imperative style. Consider the following formulation of the
factorial function:
i := 1
j := 1
while i < n do
i := i + 1
j := i · j
print j
The loop is preceded by some variable assignments which determine an initial
state, each iteration of the loop modifies the state until it terminates, and finally
the output of the computation is read off from the state.
Another programwhichfits the imperativeparadigm is of course the epsilon
substitution method, where one imagines epsilon terms as global variables:
Our initial state assigns to each epsilon term the value 0, and each stage of
the method updates the state by correcting an epsilon term until a suitable
approximation is found. The closely related learning procedures of the last
section can be seen in a similar way.
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Programs extracted using the functional interpretations are, however, pri-
marily expressed in someabstract functional language. In functional languages,
the emphasis is on what a program should do, rather than how is does it. Pro-
grams are written as simple recursive equations and the concept of global state
is not naturally present. In the functional style, the factorial function would be
specified as just
f (0) = 1 f (n + 1) = (n + 1) · f (n)
The use of simple higher-order functional languages like System T is a central
feature of the functional interpretations, and as highlighted in Section 4, a key
component of their success. Nevertheless, there is a natural way of incorpo-
rating imperative features into functional calcui: The use a monad, a structure
familiar to any functional programmer. A full technical definition of a monad
and it’s role in programming is far beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g.
[32, 52]), but we will give quick sketch of the state monad, which is of relevance
in this section.
Suppose we are working in a simple functional calculus like System T and
we want to capture some overriding global state which keeps track of certain
aspects of the computations. To this end, we introduce to our calculus a new
type S of states, together with an mapping T on types defined by
TX := S → X × S.
This is the state monad. Monads come equipped with two operators: A unit of
type X → TX and a bind of type TX → (X → TY) → TY. For the state monad
these are given by the maps
unit(x) := λs.(x, s)
bind(a)(b) := λs.bxs′ where (x, s′) = as
In our enriched language, base types X are interpreted as monadic types TX =
S → X × S, while function types X → Y are interpreted as objects of type
X → TY = X → S → Y × S. The unit map specifies a neutral translation from
terms of plain type to the corresponding monadic type: For the state monad,
neutrality means that the state remains unchanged. The bind map allows us to
apply monadic functions to monadic arguments, as we will see below.
In the pure functional world, a term of ground type X is just a program
which evaluates to some value of that type. Under the state monad, it becomes
a term which takes an initial state s1 and returns a pair (u, s2) consisting of a
value of type X and a final state s2. Similarly, in the pure word, a term of type
X → Y is a function which takes an input x and returns an output y. Under
the state monad, it becomes a function which takes an input x together with an
initial state s1 and returns an output-final state pair (y, s2).
To emphasise this point, consider our two version of the factorial function.
The purely functional one has typeN → N: it takes an input a number n and
evaluates to n!. The imperative version, however, acts on an underlying state:
It takes as input the number n together with the initial state (i, j) := (1, 1) and
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returns the output n! together with the final state (i, j) := (n, n!). In this sense it
has typeN→ S →N × S.
The bind operator is responsible for function application on the monadic
level: It takes a monadic argument a : TX together with a monadic function b :
X → TY and returns a monadic output bind(a)(b) : TY. This output mimics the
following procedure: We take our initial state s1 and plug it into our argument
a to obtain a pair (u, s2) of type X × S. We treat s2 as an intermediate state in the
computation, and plug both it and the value u into the monadic function b to
obtain a pair (v, s3) of type Y × S.
The purpose of all this is to try to convey to the reader how stateful functions
like our while loop can be simulated in a functional environment via the state
monad. We can, more generally, translate the finite types as a whole to a corre-
sponding hierarchy of monadic types, and using the unit and bind operations
define a translation on pure terms of System T to monadic terms in a variety
of ways, depending on what kind of computation we are trying to simulate
and what kind of information we aim to capture in our state. Again, this is
presented in detail in [32, 52].
So how can all this be applied to the Dialectica interpretation? Suppose we
have a proof of a simple ∀∃ statement ∀x∃yQ(x, y): The dialectica interpretation
would normally extract a pure program
f : X → Y
which takes an input x ∈ X and returns an output y ∈ Y satisfying Q(x, y).
However, using the state monad together with a suitable translation on terms,
we could instead set up the interpretation so that it extracts a state sensitive
program
b : X → S → Y × S
which takes an input x ∈ X and initial state s1 ∈ S, and returns an output pair
bxs = (y, s2), where y satisfies Q(x, y) and the final state s2 tells us something
about what our function did during the computation, the idea being to make
explicit in some sense the underlying substitution, or learning algorithm.
In a recent paper [46], I explore some of the things which a global state can
do in this context, focusing in particular on the program’s ‘interaction with the
mathematical environment’. In other words, when performing a computation
on someambientmathematical structure, be it a predicate,a boundedmonotone
sequence, a colouring of a graph etc., the state monad is used to track the way
in which the program queries this environment as it attempts to build an
approximation to some object related to that structure e.g. an approximate
drinker, an interval of metastability, an approximate monochromatic set etc.
In this way, the state monad allows us to smoothly capture the epsilon style
procedures which implicitly underlie the normalization of extracted functional
terms.
Let’s try to illustrate thiswith a very simple exampleusing, for the final time,
the drinkers paradox. Note that the ∀∃ formula we have in mind here is the
(partial)Dialectica interpretation of DPN, namely∀g∃x(P(x)→ P(gx)). Suppose
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that our mathematical environment consists of a single predicate P, and that
our states are defined to be finite piece of information about this predicate i.e.
for s ∈ Swe have
s = [Q0(n0), . . . ,Qk−1(nk−1)]
for where Qi is either P or ¬P. Our realizer could then take a state s as an
input, and whenever it tests P on a given value it will add this information
to the state. For the usual drinkers paradox, we would get the following
variation of the program given in Section 5, which now has the monadic type
(N→ N)→ S →N × S:
Φgs :=

〈0, s :: ¬P(0)〉 if ¬P(0)
〈0, s :: P(0) :: P(g0)〉 if P(g0)
〈g0, s :: P(0) :: ¬P(g0)〉 otherwise
This breaks our usual case distinction into parts, starting by testing the truth
value of P(0). If this is false, we know that P(0) → P(g0) is true and thus
0 is realizer for DP, and we add what we have learned about P to the state.
On the other hand, if P(0) is true, the truth value of P(0) → P(g0) is still
undetermined, so we must now test P(g0), leading to two possible outcomes.
Unlike the pure program, our stateful program returns a reason as to why the
witness it has returnedworks, givingus the informationabout themathematical
environment which has determined its choice. Alternatively put, our program
returns a record of the underlying substitution procedure carried out by the
term. As usual we present this as an algorithm in Figure 11.
We emphasise that this is just a simple illustration of how the state could be
used to enhance the programs we extract - to just record the interactions which
have taken placewith the mathematical environment. In particular, the realizer
makes no use of what is currently written in the state. One could change this
so that it first looks to see whether a truth value of e.g. P(0) is already present
in s, and only then proceed to test P(0). In cases where the cost of evaluating P
is high, this would improve the efficiency of the extracted program, allowing
us to store previously computed values so that they can be accessed at a later
stage in the computation. More sophisticated variants are possible: Where P is
not decidable, we can simply make an arbitrary choice for its truth value and
make the validity of our output witness dependent on the truth of the state.
In [46] a very general framework for working with state is presented via an
abstract soundness theorem, and a range of applications are discussed, ranging
from Herbrand’s theorem to program synthesis.
I am certainly not alone in turning towards concepts such asmonads to try to
better explain what is going on under the syntax of traditional interpretations,
although to date there is comparatively little research in this direction. Similar
work, also pertaining to the Dialectica interpretation, has been carried out by
Pedrot in [40]. Berger et al. have used the state monad to automatically extract
list sorting programs using modified realizability [14], while the state monad
is utilised by Birolo in [15] to give a more general version of Aschieri-Berardi
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Algorithm: Program with state
s

0, s :: ¬P(0) P(0)?
NO
oo
YES

s :: P(0)

g0, s :: P(0) :: ¬P(g0) P(g0)?
NO
oo
YES

0, s :: P(0) :: P(g0)
Figure 11: Interpretation of DP with state
learning realizability. Interestingly, monads also feature prominently in the
construction of the Dialectica categories [17] - abstract presentations of the
interpretation which formed early models of linear logic - though there they
play a somewhat different role.
6 Conclusion
I began this paper with an introduction to the epsilon calculus, a proof theo-
retic technique almost a century old and originating in the foundational crisis
of mathematics. I concluded in the present day by sketching how stateful pro-
grams are being used to capture algorithmic aspects of proof interpretations
and characterise the operational behaviour of extracted programs.
Yet the ideas which underpin the latter are in some way already present
in the substitution method, illustrating how certain universal characteristics
seem to underlie computational interpretations of classical logic, manifesting
themselves in different ways in different settings.
In my short presentations of the three traditional proof interpretations, I
hope to have hinted at the deep connections that they share, which are not
necessarily apparent in their formal definitions. Some of these connections
have beenmademore explicit inmodern research, in particular the utilisation of
epsilon substitution-like procedures in the setting of functional interpretations,
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which formed the main topic of the second part of this paper.
As proof theory moves away from foundational concerns and towards ap-
plications in mathematics and computer science, is has become increasingly
relevant to utilise new languages and techniques tomodernise traditional proof
theoretic methods, and it will be fascinating to see how proof interpretations
continue to evolve.
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